East Asian Science, Technology and Society 12 4 : Article history Received:. Internet , social media , young people , Australia , Korea , curated activities , ephemerality , social networks. Issue Section:. You do not currently have access to this content. Sign in. Client Account. You could not be signed in. Sign In Forgot password? Don't have an account? Sign in via your Institution Sign In.
- [IAMCR] New Book: Internet and Emotions?
- The Pastors Lover (Things You Cant Tell Mama).
- internet and emotions routledge studies in science technology and society Manual?
- Love by the Letter (Unexpected Brides): A Novella.
- The Punching Bag (Second Edition) (The Nero Trilogy Book 1).
- Routledge Studies in Science, Technology and Society.
- The Few of the Earth - part 1?
Buy This Article. View Metrics. Citing articles via Google Scholar.
Email alerts Latest Issue. Advance Publication. Subscribe to Article Alert. Instafame: Luxury Selfies in the Attention Economy. Journal Work: Africa Is a Country. Related Topics Internet social media young people Australia Korea curated activities ephemerality social networks. Related Book Chapters Conclusion. Baccalaureate Connecting and Disconnecting.
Recommended For You
Indeed, these critics argue that everyone holds their values dogmatically because values cannot be influenced by facts. Thus, when social values or interests influence scientific work they make it bad science. Since many feminists argue that feminist values are able to improve science, this is a challenge to which they must respond.
One way to do this would be to make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate uses of values.
This is the approach that Elizabeth Anderson takes a, As an illustration of the use of values in a legitimate way non-dogmatically Anderson offers an analysis of Abigail Stewart et al. According to Anderson, the values that Stewart and her team of researchers brought to their investigation are of the sort that are answerable to empirical evidence—the evidence of emotional states.
Anderson argues that values are subject to critical scrutiny and revision in light of arguments and evidence; briefly, experiences such as disillusionment allow most people those who are not dogmatic to learn from experience that some of their values are mistaken. Like most experiences, emotional experiences have cognitive, usually representative, content and we can find out that the representative content is erroneous, confused, etc. Thus, if we find out that the cognitive content of an emotional experience is defective in some way, we might discount the importance of the feeling, too.
Such emotional experiences can function as evidence for values because these experiences are independent of our desires and ends. We can be persuaded by reasons and by facts that despite our emotional experience of something or someone, that thing or person is valuable or not.
This sort of persuasive argument is quite common and makes sense only because our emotions are responsive to facts. And usually our emotions are reliable, though certainly not infallible, evidence for our value judgments. The exceptions include emotions affected by drugs, depression, etc.
Anderson examines how background values function at various stages of Stewart et al. To illustrate, we focus on just one of these stages—the way that values enter into understanding the objects of inquiry. Anderson notes that, for example, the values incorporated in the concept of divorce used by Stewart's team differ from those incorporated into Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly's research on divorce Wallerstein and Kelly For Wallerstein and Kelly divorce is conceived of as a loss or trauma.
Stewart's team, in contrast, took divorce to be a process of adjustment to a new state.
There are two important differences in this alternative conception of divorce. The first is that divorce is not treated as a one-time event with an aftermath but rather as an ongoing life adjustment. Second, the process of adjustment is open-ended allowing for both positive and negative effects. Wallerstein and Kelly's framing of divorce as a trauma or loss calls for researchers to focus on the negative effects and so shapes the data collection.
Anderson's analysis makes it clear that both studies incorporate values—it is not that one is value-free and the other value-laden. However, Stewart et al's values are explicitly and self-consciously present and thus, open to empirical scrutiny. Anderson's argument is that Stewart et al. However, what differs is her analysis of the values invoked in the study and their responsiveness to empirical evidence. Stewart's conception of the objects of inquiry allows for both negative and positive experiences to count as evidence of the effects of divorce and so the way her team conceptualizes the objects of inquiry allows for a consideration of all of the evidence unlike Wallerstein and Kelly's research which focuses only on the negative effects.
Chapter 8. Media and Technology – Introduction to Sociology – 1st Canadian Edition
Thus Anderson's analysis of the research indicates how the feminist values held by the researchers and incorporated into the research produce more empirically adequate, and hence better, science. Sharyn Clough's approach to the question of values in science develops a view based on Donald Davidson's account of belief formation—an extension of Quinean holism. She has made use of her account to examine how sexist and racist values are not well-supported by evidence and hence science that is sexist and racist is clearly not good science Clough a; Clough and Loges She has also examined how feminist values improve research.
One recent example is her analysis of research on the hygiene hypothesis—the hypothesis that increased levels of concern about sanitation and the consequent decrease in exposure to micro-organisms and pathogens is related to increasingly high rates of auto-immune disease and allergies, particularly in the industrialized nations of the North and West Clough , The primary evidence for the hypothesis is the correlation between the rates of disease and the hygiene habits in the areas where the rates have increased. Further support for the hypothesis is garnered from recent research that shows that increased exposure to microbes in childhood is correlated with increased immunity in adulthood.
Clough explores this case from a feminist perspective after noting additional data—the affected populations those suffering from the illnesses have disproportionate representation of women and girls. Clough argues that when viewed through an awareness of the gender structure of human societies, which generally require higher standards of cleanliness for female children than for males, this greater incidence of morbidity among females becomes evidence for the hygiene hypothesis and thus provides an opportunity for increased empirical adequacy.
In other words, not paying attention to gender—not using the minimum feminist value that gender matters—narrows the range of data that researchers treat as evidence. Thus values have the potential to increase the empirical adequacy of an account. In effect, feminist values give rise to an augmented hygiene hypothesis that takes into account the differential enforcement of standards of cleanliness and so predicts a decreased immunity in adult females.
Together, all of our beliefs form a holistic web of meaning, to use the Quinean metaphor. These two examples provide an illustration of how case study analysis may be used to work through the role that values can serve in good science and so how the general sorts of insights that holist accounts provide can be made specific. Each of the accounts discussed requires that political, social, moral, and cultural values of the sort that are traditionally understood to be non-epistemic must answer to empirical evidence.
While they differ on the philosophical details of exactly how evidence bears on theory, the accounts have strong similarities and suggest avenues for reconciliation or even convergence. But holist accounts do present challenges in this regard. Solomon has expressed concerns about the ability of feminist holist empiricism to provide a general analysis of how values function in knowledge production. She questions whether any single approach to values will be able to provide an account of the various ways that values may function in science.
She argues that values are not all of one type and consequently, when relevant and they may not always be relevant, according to Solomon they may be relevant in different ways, playing different roles in knowledge production.
Related Internet and Emotions (Routledge Studies in Science, Technology and Society)
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved